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Abstract. Fiscal policy in the Euro area has been dominated by austerity measures 
implemented under the institutional setting of the 'reformed' stability and growth pact, and 
the even stricter 'fiscal compact' for some years. Since mid-2014 calls for a more 
expansionary fiscal policy to overcome the economic crisis have become more frequent.  
The EU-Commission in this spirit has launched the Juncker-Plan to stimulate (public) 
investment and is using a less strict interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact in order 
to provide more fiscal leeway for countries under unfavourable economic circumstances. 
This paper argues that these steps do not go far enough and that indeed a truly expansionary 
fiscal policy in the dimension of two to three per cent of Euro area GDP for a few years is 
possible even within the existing institutional framework. Special emphasis is put on the 
method of cyclical adjustment employed by the European Commission in order to assess 
member states‟ fiscal position and effort as well as on ways to increase public investment. 
It is demonstrated that even in the existing framework the leeway for a macroeconomically 
and socially more sensible fiscal policy using the interpretational leeway inherent in the 
rules could be quite substantial. 
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1. Introduction 
iscal policy in most Euro area countries has been dominated by austerity 
measures implemented under the institutional setting of the 'reformed' 
stability and growth pact and the 'fiscal compact' for several years. From a 
Keynesian perspective the outcome in terms of devastating economic, social and 
political consequences was predictable (see e.g. Observatoire Français des 
Conjonctures Économiques et al. 2012; Truger 2013). The serious risk of a vicious 
circle of consolidation efforts leading to higher deficits and debt levels and in turn 
to higher consolidation efforts seems to have materialised and had moved the Euro 
area economy at the verge of deflationary stagnation by 2012-2014.   
Therefore, since about spring 2014 the calls for a more expansionary fiscal 
policy have become louder, as it was getting clearer that monetary policy alone will 
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not be able to spark off the recovery. In his famous Jackson Hole speech Mario 
Draghi called for a more expansionary fiscal stance for the Euro area as a whole 
and a public investment programme on the European level insisting, however, that 
the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) be respected (Draghi, 
2014). The European Council at its meeting in June 2014 also saw the need to 
support growth, but insisted as well that this be realised within the current 
institutional framework: „The possibilities offered by the EU's existing fiscal 
framework to balance fiscal discipline with the need to support growth should be 
used.‟ (European Council, 2014, 7). With regard to this finally the new European 
Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker has launched mainly two initiatives 
substantially enlarging its predecessor‟s efforts: The „Juncker-Plan‟ and a 
clarification on making optimal use of the flexibility within the SGP (European 
Commission 2014f; 2015). However, quite obviously, those initiatives have so far 
not been effective. Despite all efforts growth forecasts for the euro area have been 
stagnating since summer 2014. 
Against this background the central question is whether for lack of will to 
change the existing   institutional framework – that had even severely been 
tightened by the reforms of the SGP and the Fiscal Compact (European 
Commission 2013a, 13-42) – still allows for a fiscal expansion strong enough to 
spark off a real recovery in the stagnating Euro area economy. The current paper 
argues that, indeed, there is substantial leeway for expansionary fiscal policies 
provided that the European Commission is willing to more aggressively use the 
technical and interpretational leeway that is inherent in the central ambiguous 
concepts used in the current framework.  
In order to show this, section 2 will reconsider the crucial concept of cyclical 
adjustment and its pro-cyclicality. As a consequence of the prolonged economic 
crisis the estimate of potential output has been pro-cyclically decreased leading in 
turn to an underestimation of the output gap and an overestimation of the structural 
budget deficits. Section 2 shows that correcting for those effects – by simply not 
revising potential output growth projections since the spring 2010 Commission 
forecast – leads to substantially higher estimates for the size of austerity 
programmes which is very well in line with the development of output in most 
Euro area economies. Section 3 turns to the European Commission‟s way of 
dealing with the problem and argues that its initiatives do not go far enough. 
Section 4 then tries to identify the remaining leeway for a fiscal boost to the 
European economy within the existing institutional framework. Section 5 briefly 
draws some policy conclusions.   
 
2. Cyclical adjustment of public finances and austerity in 
the Euro area 
2.1. The pro-cyclical nature of the EU Commission’s potential output 
estimates  
Cyclical adjustment in general and that of public finances in particular plays a 
major role in the EU Commission‟s concept of budgetary surveillance within the 
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact (Larch & 
Turrini 2010). With the exception of the excessive deficit threshold all target 
values for the government budget balance are expressed in terms of structural, i.e. 
cyclically adjusted, values, and the cyclical condition of the economy plays a major 
role in assessing the necessary consolidation effort and potential exceptions. The 
most important concept in this respect is the structural budget balance, i.e. the 
cyclically adjusted government budget balance corrected for one-off measures in 
terms of which the consolidation requirements under the SGP (and the fiscal 
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compact) are expressed. The method used by the Commission so far severely 
overestimates the consolidation requirements and underestimates the fiscal effort 
already undertaken by the member states. All of this is well known and has in 
principle already been acknowledged by the Commission and used to justify 
exceptional circumstances for several countries in retrospect. However, the 
Commission hesitates to modify its method in a more foreward-looking manner 
and grant fiscal policy the leeway that is essential to end the stagnation in the Euro 
area and the depression in the periphery (see section 4 below). A reassessment of 
the structural balances in combination with the application of the recent findings as 
to the size of the fiscal multiplier may be sufficient to bring about a substantially 
positive fiscal stimulus.  
The European Commission proceeds in two steps in its calculations. First 
potential GDP is estimated in order to determine the cyclical condition of the 
economy, i.e. the output gap as the percentage deviation of actual from potential 
output. Second, with the help of budgetary semi-elasticities (Mourre et al. 2014) 
the cyclical impact on the budget balance is identified which then allows 
calculation of cyclically adjusted balances. The separation of trend or potential 
GDP and cyclical GDP and its effects on the budget balance constitutes a major 
progress compared to a situation in which fiscal policy targets are formulated in 
terms of the actual budget deficit which would result in completely pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies.  
However, many fundamental objections can be raised. First, it must be doubted 
whether the setting of strict target values for the government budget balance is 
adequate, because, in fact, fiscal policy plays a major role in stabilising the 
economy and should therefore not be constrained (see e.g. Arestis, 2011). Second, 
the theoretical idea behind the concept of identifying potential GDP that is 
determined by structural factors, above all those of the labour market, can be 
criticised for a number of reasons (Hein & Stockhammer, 2011). Third, and 
somewhat more pragmatically, the usual methods of cyclical adjustment tend to 
underestimate the cyclical fluctuations and will therefore have pro-cyclical effects 
if applied to fiscal policy. In the rest of this section we focus on the latter aspect 
and illustrate the pro-cyclical downward revision of the European Commission‟s 
potential GDP estimates during the Euro crisis, particularly in the crisis countries 
and the resulting underestimation of the tremendous consolidation efforts and its 
potential contribution to the economic crisis.     
The European Commission estimates potential output by means of a Cobb-
Douglas-production function. This combines a potential labour input (the product 
of the working age population, the participation rate and per capita hours of work 
minus structural unemployment), a capital input (the product of the gross fixed 
investment in relation to potential output and potential output minus depreciation) 
and total factor productivity (see D‟Auria et al. 2010). The estimate of potential 
output is a medium-term projection based on short-term forecasts. All the 
ingredients are forecast separately: demographic trends, the participation rate, 
structural unemployment, per capita hours of work, the investment ratio, the rate of 
depreciation (usually a constant), and the total factor productivity as Kalman-
filtered capacity utilisation. The estimate is calculated for all EU Member States 
using semi-standardised specifications. The specifications are usually adjusted 
regularly.  
The main problem in the current context is that the method employed by the 
EU-commission has proven to be highly sensitive to the endogeneity bias, i.e. the 
problem that potential output is highly sensitive to variations in actual output (see 
Logeay & Tober 2006; Klär 2013 and 2014; Truger & Will 2013). During 
economic contractions – especially during large and durable contractions as those 
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that had to be observed in the Euro crisis – the estimates of potential output are 
substantially revised downwards: Increases in actual unemployment will be 
reflected in increases in NAWRU estimates and stagnating investment will reduce 
the estimate of the capital stock in the production function (for the Euro area see 
Klär, 2014 in detail as well as Andrade & Duarte 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1. Real actual and potential GDP for Spain as of different European Commission’s 
forecasts, annual growth rate in %, 2000-2015 
Source: European Commission (2015b), authors‟ calculations. 
 
The effects can very well be illustrated for the Spanish case (see figure 1). 
Before the crisis potential output growth as estimated by the Commission in its 
autumn 2007 forecast was around 4 per cent annually with a clear slowdown to 
around 2.5 per cent due to the expected slowdown in actual economic growth from 
2008 onwards. After the bubble had burst and Spain was only slowly recovering 
from the global economic and financial crisis in spring 2010 the commission very 
substantially decreased its potential output estimates for the Spanish economy to 
only 0.5 per cent. After consecutive waves of austerity had taken effect and had 
driven the Spanish economy back into serious recession in 2012 and 2013 potential 
output was again revised downwards in a dramatic way: In its autumn 2015 
forecast the Commission expected potential output to be even  shrinking for four 
consecutive years from 2012 to 2015. 
It is of course difficult – if not impossible – to decide by how much the crisis 
has really affected potential output (OFCE, Economic Council of the Labour 
Movement. Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung in der Hans-
Böckler-Stiftung, 2013). However, it is plausible to assume that the medium term 
growth prospects were negatively affected by the bursting of the Spanish real estate 
bubble. But that does not mean that it is plausible to assume that the downward 
revision continues more than four years after the crisis hit. Indeed, given the pro-
cyclical nature of the production function approach used by the Commission it is 
much more likely that the ongoing downward revisions simply reflect the 
worsening cyclical condition of the Spanish economy that in turn was brought 
about by massive austerity policies.  
2.2. Methodology  
The aim of our numerical analysis is to show what would have happened to the 
cyclical adjustment calculations by the Commission if it had not been for the 
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repeated downward revisions of the potential output estimates. Therefore, in the 
first step we need an alternative assumption for the development of potential 
growth: Here we simply use the Commission spring 2010 forecast of potential 
output, because at that time potential GDP estimates had already been revised 
downwards very substantially. We just rule out any further revision of potential 
output after spring 2010. The reason is that after the deep recession in 2010 most 
Euro area economies were recovering before in the summer of that year a sudden 
switch to a fast exit and the beginning of austerity in the Euro area was decided 
(see Blyth 2013, chapter 3). One might argue that a further downward revision of 
potential GDP after 2010 might be plausible also from a more Keynesian point of 
view if hysteresis was involved. However, first, the downward revision implicit in 
the EU Commission‟s calculations is occurring in a very fast manner. Second, the 
Keynesian solution would be to prevent or fight those effects by counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy. Therefore, we think it plausible and consistent to take the year 2010 
as a starting point for the alternative calculations, because it is exactly the year in 
which counter-cyclical policy was given up and replaced by austerity policies. We 
then determine the alternative output gap by comparing actual GDP as of the 
Commission autumn 2015 forecast with our alternative potential output.
i
  
In the second step we calculate our alternative cyclical component by 
multiplying the EU Commission‟s budgetary semi-elasticities for the individual 
countries (Mourre et al. 2014) with our corrected output gap. This in turn allows us 
to calculate the structural budget balances. The annual fiscal stance can then be 
determined as the year on year change in the primary structural budget balance, 
which can also be cumulated for several years to show the overall fiscal stance for 
a given period of time. 
This is exactly the method that was used in Truger (2015b and 2015c) based on 
the spring 2014 forecast data. Updating the calculations for the autumn 2015 
forecast data poses two major challenges due to the general revision of the system 
of national accounts from ESA 95 to ESA 2010 since the autumn 2014 forecast 
(see Dunn, Akritidis, & Biedma, 2014). Due to the revision, a direct comparison 
with data from earlier vintages (based on ESA 95) was no longer possible. As this 
comparison is necessary to show the revisions of potential output and the resulting 
fiscal impulses, some adjustments had to be made.  
The new ESA 2010 framework in general led to an upward revision of GDP for 
all countries, mainly because R&D activities and military spending on weapons 
systems are now counted as investment expenditures. Together with other 
relatively smaller changes, this led to an increased level of output. All in all, 
methodological changes and statistical improvements led to upward GDP revisions 
of 3.7 percent for the EU28 countries under the new methodology, while growth 
rates remained virtually unchanged. (Dunn, Akritidis, & Biedma, 2014). To 
incorporate the changes in the GDP level, nominal GDP as estimated in the last 
vintage under ESA 95 (spring 2014) was compared with the first vintage under 
ESA 2010 (autumn 2014) and the old Commission 2010 data was adjusted by the 
difference with some corrections for forecast revisions in the more recent years 
from 2011 to 2015.  
Additionally, for ESA 2010 the Commission no longer provides data for the 
structural budget balance for years preceding 2010, because one-off measures have 
not been revised backwards far enough. In order to include an estimate of the fiscal 
stance for 2010 – which was a crucial year for austerity policies – we used the one-
offs and temporary measures provided by the last ESA 95 data from the EU 
Commission spring 2014 forecast (EU Commission 2014a) for the years 2007-
2009 to calculate the structural balances. One has to be aware that there is a 
structural break in the time series in 2010, but as for most countries the differences 
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between the ESA 2010 and the ESA 95 one-offs are not large in more recent years 
so that we think our approach is justified. 
In our analysis we focus on the 12 countries of the „old‟ Euro area for several 
reasons: Firstly, with the exception of Slovenia this is the Euro area that existed at 
the pre-crisis starting point of our calculations. Secondly, because of the permanent 
new accessions to the Euro zone, otherwise a consistent Euro area average would 
not have existed. Thirdly, the crisis countries in the periphery, that were in the 
focus of the debate from the beginning, all belonged to the group of „old‟ member 
states. Of course, this is not, at all, to say that the problems addressed here were not 
relevant for the „new‟ member countries or that these countries were less 
important. In fact, as in their case potential output calculations have to be based on 
relatively few observations and their output development was quite erratic over 
time, the resulting endogeneity problems may well be even stronger. However, this 
deserves to be tackled in greater depth than is possible in this paper. 
2.3. The resulting underestimation of the fall in the output gap  
Table 1 shows the Commission‟s autum 2015 estimates of member states‟ 
output gaps and contrasts them with the output gaps that would have been 
estimated had the spring 2010 potential GDP forecasts remained unchanged. From 
2013 to 2015 for all countries with the exception of Germany the output gap would 
have been substantially more negative had it not been for the crisis induced 
downward revision of potential GDP since spring 2010. For the EMU-12 average 
the output gap more than tripes from -2 % to -6.9 % of GDP in 2015. Particularly 
for the crisis countries this effect is even stronger: For Greece an output gap of -
26.9 % as compared to the official estimate of only 5.6 % is calculated. 
 
Table 1. Output gap in % of potential GDP, EMU-12 countries 2007-2015 with  potential 
GDP growth of EU Commission’s fall 2015 forecast compared to EU Commission’s spring 
2010 forecast  
  Output gap with potential GDP from EU Commission fall 2015  
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria 2,0 2,0 -2,7 -1,7 0,4 0,4 -0,3 -0,8 -0,9 
Belgium 3,3 2,6 -1,3 0,0 0,2 -0,6 -1,1 -1,0 -1,2 
Euro area (12 countries) 2,5 1,6 -3,4 -2,0 -1,1 -2,2 -3,0 -2,7 -2,0 
Finland 4,6 3,7 -5,1 -2,5 -0,2 -1,6 -2,8 -2,8 -2,4 
France 3,1 1,8 -2,1 -1,2 -0,2 -0,8 -1,4 -2,0 -1,8 
Germany 1,6 1,6 -4,7 -1,6 0,8 0,0 -1,1 -0,9 -0,7 
Greece 5,2 4,2 0,5 -3,0 -8,8 -11,6 -11,9 -8,6 -5,6 
Ireland 6,0 1,7 -4,6 -4,8 -2,7 -4,0 -5,5 -3,7 -3,7 
Italy 2,2 1,0 -4,2 -2,2 -1,6 -3,3 -4,2 -3,9 -3,1 
Luxembourg 3,9 1,2 -6,0 -2,7 -2,4 -4,9 -5,0 -4,8 -4,0 
Netherlands 1,5 1,8 -2,5 -2,0 -1,1 -3,0 -3,9 -3,6 -2,9 
Portugal 1,0 0,5 -2,5 -0,7 -2,1 -4,9 -5,6 -4,4 -2,9 
Spain 3,1 1,3 -3,3 -4,3 -5,3 -6,8 -7,2 -5,5 -2,9 
 Output gap with potential GDP from EU Commission spring 2010  
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria 3,9 3,3 -2,2 -1,3 0,3 -0,5 -2,1 -3,7 -4,7 
Belgium 3,1 2,5 -1,4 -0,1 0,4 -0,6 -1,5 -1,6 -1,7 
Euro area (12 countries) 2,4 1,4 -3,9 -2,7 -2,2 -4,2 -6,1 -6,8 -6,9 
Finland 7,2 5,2 -5,2 -3,0 -1,8 -4,5 -7,1 -8,6 -9,7 
France 1,0 -0,5 -4,2 -3,9 -3,0 -3,8 -4,8 -5,8 -6,1 
Germany 2,8 2,9 -3,7 -0,6 1,7 0,4 -1,1 -1,1 -0,9 
Greece 3,0 1,1 -3,7 -8,9 -17,5 -23,3 -26,7 -26,7 -26,8 
Ireland 2,2 -2,1 -7,9 -8,0 -5,7 -7,7 -10,2 -9,1 -9,0 
Italy 2,1 0,5 -4,9 -3,5 -3,5 -6,9 -9,5 -11,0 -11,7 
Luxembourg 7,5 -0,3 -8,7 -4,8 -4,6 -7,6 -9,0 -9,5 -9,6 
Netherlands 3,3 3,0 -2,3 -2,0 -1,6 -4,5 -6,9 -8,0 -8,4 
Portugal 3,9 3,0 -0,2 1,4 -0,9 -6,0 -8,8 -9,6 -9,6 
Spain 1,3 0,6 -4,2 -4,9 -5,9 -8,8 -11,3 -11,7 -10,9 
  Difference 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria 1,9 1,4 0,5 0,4 -0,1 -0,9 -1,8 -2,8 -3,9 
Belgium -0,3 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,2 0,1 -0,3 -0,6 -0,6 
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Euro area (12 countries) -0,1 -0,2 -0,5 -0,7 -1,1 -2,0 -3,1 -4,1 -4,9 
Finland 2,6 1,5 0,0 -0,5 -1,6 -2,9 -4,4 -5,8 -7,3 
France -2,1 -2,2 -2,1 -2,7 -2,8 -3,0 -3,4 -3,9 -4,3 
Germany 1,2 1,3 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,4 -0,1 -0,3 -0,2 
Greece -2,2 -3,1 -4,1 -5,8 -8,7 -11,7 -14,8 -18,1 -21,3 
Ireland -3,8 -3,7 -3,3 -3,2 -3,0 -3,7 -4,7 -5,4 -5,3 
Italy -0,2 -0,4 -0,7 -1,3 -1,9 -3,6 -5,3 -7,1 -8,6 
Luxembourg 3,6 -1,5 -2,7 -2,0 -2,2 -2,8 -4,1 -4,7 -5,6 
Netherlands 1,9 1,2 0,2 0,0 -0,5 -1,4 -3,0 -4,4 -5,6 
Portugal 2,9 2,6 2,4 2,1 1,2 -1,1 -3,3 -5,2 -6,8 
Spain -1,8 -0,7 -0,8 -0,5 -0,6 -2,0 -4,1 -6,1 -8,0 
Source: EU Commission (2010a; 2014a; 2014b; 2015b), authors‟ calculations.          
 
2.4. The resulting underestimation of fiscal restraint in the Euro areaand 
effects on economic performance  
The dramatic downward revisions of potential GDP shown in the previous 
section have substantial consequences for the calculation of structural budget 
balances and the assessment of consolidation efforts (see Eschenbach & 
Schuknecht 2004, Romer & Romer 2010 as well as Guajardo, Leigh & Pescatori 
2011). These efforts will usually be underestimated because a substantial part of 
the fiscal effort is wiped out, as a larger part of the actual deficit is registered as 
structural although in fact it may well just be cyclical, i.e. caused by the (in 
principle) temporary contraction.
ii
  
This can be demonstrated by comparing the fiscal stance derived from the 
Commission‟s estimates with the one derived from the Commission‟s estimates 
correcting for revisions in potential output since spring 2010 (tables 2 and 3). The 
structural primary budget balance is the cyclically adjusted budget balance 
corrected for one-off measures less interest payments on outstanding government 
debt. Table 2 gives an overview of the development of the structural primary 
budget balance in the Euro area countries from 2008 to 2015 (estimate) and the 
resulting cumulative discretionary fiscal stance from the trough of the crisis in 
2009 as calculated by the EU Commission in its autumn 2015 economic forecast. 
Positive (negative) values for the fiscal stance indicate contractionary 
(expansionary) fiscal policy. As can be seen the so called „fiscal effort‟, i.e. the 
discretionary measures taken in order to consolidate the budget is quite substantial. 
On average for the EMU-12 as a whole the cumulative volume of consolidation 
measures is almost 3 % of GDP from 2009 to 2015 with the bulk of measures 
realised within only three years from 2011 to 2013 and a more or less neutral fiscal 
policy since then. As was to be expected Greece and to a lesser extent Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal stand out with a total volume of 7.4 (Portugal) to 13.3 % 
(Greece) of GDP. France and Italy show substantial efforts slightly below the 
EMU-12 average whereas the Netherlands and above all Belgium, Germany and 
Austria consolidated to a much lesser extent. According to the EU Commission‟s 
calculations Luxemburg and Finland even showed some substantial fiscal 
expansion. 
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Table 2. General government structural primary budget balance (SPB) and (cumulative) 
fiscal stance (annual change in the SPB), Euro area countries 2007-2015 in % of GDP 
 
   Balances 
    2007* 2008* 2009* 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria 0,6 0,3 -0,6 -0,3 0,3 0,9 1,4 1,8 1,8 
Belgium 2,4 1,7 0,0 -0,3 -0,4 0,1 0,6 0,3 0,4 
Euro area (12 countries) 0,8 -0,1 -1,5 -1,5 -0,6 1,0 1,5 1,7 1,4 
Finland 3,9 3,4 1,8 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,3 -0,5 -0,6 
France -1,9 -1,5 -3,5 -3,5 -2,5 -1,7 -1,3 -0,6 -0,7 
Germany 1,9 1,8 1,9 0,3 1,2 2,2 2,3 2,6 2,4 
Greece -4,4 -6,4 -10,1 -4,3 0,9 4,7 6,0 4,5 3,2 
Ireland -1,2 -6,2 -7,5 -5,9 -4,1 -2,4 0,0 0,8 0,3 
Italy 1,9 1,5 0,7 1,0 1,4 3,9 4,0 3,6 3,3 
Luxembourg 2,1 3,1 2,6 0,9 1,9 3,0 2,5 2,5 1,1 
Netherlands 0,9 1,0 -1,6 -1,8 -1,8 -0,6 0,6 0,9 0,3 
Portugal -0,7 -1,7 -5,3 -5,2 -1,9 1,8 2,3 3,5 3,1 
Spain 1,9 -3,3 -6,8 -5,2 -3,7 -0,4 1,5 1,6 0,6 
   Fiscal Stance (2008-2015) 
   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria  -0,3 -0,9 0,3 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,0 
Belgium  -0,7 -1,7 -0,3 -0,2 0,6 0,4 -0,3 0,1 
Euro area (12 countries)  -0,8 -1,4 0,0 0,9 1,6 0,5 0,2 -0,3 
Finland  -0,5 -1,6 -1,6 0,3 -0,3 0,0 -0,8 -0,1 
France  0,3 -2,0 0,0 1,0 0,8 0,4 0,6 -0,1 
Germany  -0,1 0,1 -1,6 0,9 1,0 0,1 0,3 -0,1 
Greece  -2,0 -3,6 5,8 5,2 3,8 1,3 -1,5 -1,3 
Ireland  -5,0 -1,2 1,6 1,7 1,8 2,3 0,8 -0,4 
Italy  -0,3 -0,8 0,3 0,4 2,5 0,0 -0,4 -0,3 
Luxembourg  1,0 -0,5 -1,7 1,0 1,1 -0,5 0,0 -1,4 
Netherlands  0,1 -2,6 -0,2 -0,1 1,2 1,2 0,3 -0,7 
Portugal  -1,0 -3,6 0,1 3,3 3,7 0,6 1,2 -0,4 
Spain  -5,2 -3,5 1,6 1,5 3,3 1,8 0,1 -1,0 
   Cumulative Fiscal Stance (2010 – 2015) 
     2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria    0,3 0,9 1,5 2,0 2,4 2,4 
Belgium    -0,3 -0,5 0,1 0,6 0,3 0,4 
Euro area (12 countries)    0,0 0,9 2,5 3,0 3,2 2,9 
Finland    -1,6 -1,3 -1,6 -1,6 -2,4 -2,4 
France    0,0 1,0 1,8 2,2 2,8 2,8 
Germany    -1,6 -0,8 0,3 0,3 0,7 0,5 
Greece    5,8 10,9 14,7 16,1 14,6 13,3 
Ireland    1,6 3,3 5,1 7,4 8,2 7,8 
Italy    0,3 0,6 3,2 3,2 2,8 2,6 
Luxembourg    -1,7 -0,7 0,4 -0,1 0,0 -1,5 
Netherlands    -0,2 -0,2 1,0 2,2 2,5 1,9 
Portugal    0,1 3,4 7,1 7,6 8,8 8,4 
Spain    1,6 3,1 6,4 8,3 8,4 7,4 
Note: * Due to the revision of the national accounts to ESA 2010 the EU Commission no longer 
publishes structural balances for years before 2010 since the autumn 2010 economic forecast as the 
one-off measures have not yet been revised. In the calculations we use the unrevised ESA 95 values 
for the one-off measures to calculate the structural balances (see methodology in section 2.2). 
Source: EU Commission (2010a; 2014a; 2014b, 2015a; 2015b), authors‟ calculations.          
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Table 3. General government structural primary budget balance (SPB) and (cumulative) 
fiscal stance (annual change in the SPB), Euro area countries 2007-2015 in % of GDP 
(potential GDP growth as of EC’s spring 2010 forecast) 
   Balances 
    2007* 2008* 2009* 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria -0,5 -0,5 -1,0 -0,5 0,3 1,4 2,4 3,4 4,0 
Belgium 2,6 1,7 0,1 -0,2 -0,5 0,1 0,8 0,6 0,8 
Euro area (12 countries) 0,8 0,0 -1,3 -1,2 0,0 2,0 3,0 3,8 3,9 
Finland 2,4 2,6 1,9 0,5 1,5 1,9 2,8 2,8 3,6 
France -0,6 -0,2 -2,2 -1,9 -0,8 0,1 0,8 1,7 1,9 
Germany 1,2 1,1 1,4 -0,3 0,7 2,0 2,3 2,7 2,5 
Greece -3,3 -4,9 -8,1 -1,4 5,1 10,4 13,3 13,4 13,6 
Ireland 0,8 -4,2 -5,7 -4,2 -2,6 -0,4 2,4 3,6 3,1 
Italy 2,0 1,7 1,1 1,7 2,4 5,9 6,8 7,4 8,0 
Luxembourg 0,5 3,8 3,8 1,8 2,8 4,2 4,3 4,6 3,6 
Netherlands -0,3 0,2 -1,7 -1,8 -1,5 0,3 2,5 3,8 3,9 
Portugal -2,2 -3,0 -6,5 -6,2 -2,5 2,3 4,0 6,2 6,6 
Spain 3,0 -2,9 -6,3 -4,8 -3,4 0,9 3,9 5,3 5,5 
   Fiscal Stance (2008-2015) 
   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria  0,0 -0,5 0,4 0,8 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,6 
Belgium  -0,8 -1,6 -0,3 -0,3 0,6 0,7 -0,2 0,1 
Euro area (12 countries)  -0,8 -1,3 0,1 1,1 2,0 1,0 0,7 0,1 
Finland  0,2 -0,7 -1,3 1,0 0,5 0,8 0,0 0,8 
France  0,5 -2,0 0,3 1,1 1,0 0,6 0,9 0,2 
Germany  -0,1 0,3 -1,6 0,9 1,3 0,3 0,5 -0,2 
Greece  -1,6 -3,2 6,6 6,6 5,3 2,9 0,1 0,3 
Ireland  -5,0 -1,5 1,5 1,6 2,2 2,8 1,2 -0,5 
Italy  -0,2 -0,6 0,6 0,7 3,5 0,9 0,6 0,5 
Luxembourg  3,3 0,0 -1,9 1,0 1,3 0,1 0,3 -1,0 
Netherlands  0,5 -1,9 -0,1 0,3 1,8 2,2 1,3 0,1 
Portugal  -0,9 -3,5 0,3 3,8 4,8 1,7 2,2 0,4 
Spain  -5,9 -3,4 1,5 1,5 4,2 3,1 1,4 0,2 
   Cumulative Fiscal Stance (2010 – 2015) 
     2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria    0,4 1,3 2,4 3,4 4,4 5,0 
Belgium    -0,3 -0,6 0,0 0,7 0,5 0,6 
Euro area (12 countries)    0,1 1,2 3,3 4,3 5,0 5,1 
Finland    -1,3 -0,4 0,1 0,9 0,9 1,7 
France    0,3 1,4 2,4 3,0 3,9 4,1 
Germany    -1,6 -0,7 0,6 0,9 1,4 1,2 
Greece    6,6 13,2 18,5 21,3 21,4 21,7 
Ireland    1,5 3,2 5,3 8,2 9,3 8,8 
Italy    0,6 1,3 4,8 5,7 6,3 6,8 
Luxembourg    -1,9 -0,9 0,4 0,5 0,9 -0,2 
Netherlands    -0,1 0,2 2,0 4,2 5,5 5,6 
Portugal    0,3 4,0 8,8 10,5 12,7 13,1 
Spain    1,5 2,9 7,2 10,3 11,6 11,8 
Note: * Due to the revision of the national accounts to ESA 2010 the EU Commission no longer 
publishes structural balances for years before 2010 since the autumn 2010 economic forecast as the 
one-off measures have not yet been revised. In the calculations we use the unrevised ESA 95 values 
for the one-off measures to calculate the structural balances (see methodology in section 2.2). 
Source: EU Commission (2010a; 2014a; 2014b, 2015a; 2015b), authors‟ calculations. 
 
Table 3 shows the corresponding numbers after controlling for the downward 
revision of potential output by assuming that the development of potential GDP 
that was forecast in spring 2010 remained unchanged. In most cases and years this 
led to an upward revision of potential GDP and therefore also an upward revision 
of the structural budget balance, which automatically leads to a more sizable 
estimate of the fiscal effort. As can be seen, in virtually all cases the resulting 
numbers for the fiscal effort are substantially higher. The cumulative fiscal effort 
for the EMU-12 average increases to 5.1 % of GDP. The size of the austerity 
packages in the periphery is revised to between 8.8 % for Ireland and 21.7% (!) for 
Greece. Finally, three countries that did not seem to show any remarkable 
consolidation efforts in the official estimates, Finland and above all Austria and the 
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Netherlands, are now seen to have gone through substantial fiscal restriction 
(cumulative 1.7, 5.0 and 5.6 % of GDP, respectively). 
The potential economic consequences of fiscal restraint in such dimensions can 
most easily be illustrated by using the concept of the fiscal multiplier. Multiplying 
the cumulative negative fiscal stance for a given year in relation to some base year 
with the multiplier gives a rough estimate of the output effects of austerity relative 
to a baseline scenario without any consolidation measures. Obviously, the size of 
the multiplier then becomes the key issue. Maybe one of the very few and small 
positive side effects of the Great Recession and the austerity crises in many 
countries is that it has strongly encouraged empirical research on fiscal policy 
effectiveness and the size of the multiplier. And, in fact, many of the recent studies 
as well as a recent meta-regression covering more than 100 different empirical 
multiplier studies by Gechert (2015) support the more Keynesian views of a 
sizeable multiplier, even substantially above one for the expenditure side.  
Of course, most of the conclusions reached by the recent studies – most notably 
that there tend to be sizeable multipliers and that expenditure multipliers are larger 
than revenue side ones (about 1 as compared to 0.5) – could also easily have been 
drawn on the basis of the earlier literature well before the crisis (see e.g. the 
overviews by Hemming, Kell & Mahfouz 2002, Arestis & Sawyer 2003, 
Bouthevillain et al. 2009 and Creel et al 2011).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative fiscal effort 2010-2015 in % of GDP and real GDP index 
(2009=100) 2009-2015, Euro area-12. 
Source: EU Commission (2010a; 2014a; 2014b, 2015a; 2015b), authors‟ calculations. 
          
Applying such sizeable multipliers to the fiscal stances just calculated 
unavoidably leads to the result of devastating economic effects of austerity policies 
in the Euro area. In fact, a strikingly clear correlation between the cumulative fiscal 
stance and the development of real GDP since the trough of the crisis can be 
established. With the exception of Ireland and Finland the countries that saw the 
strongest fiscal restriction (as calculated in table 3) obviously performed worst in 
terms of GDP growth (figure 2). This result – to a somewhat smaller degree – also 
holds when the EU commission‟s original data for the fiscal stance as displayed in 
table 2 is used. Although many other factors must be taken into account, it does 
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seem quite obvious that restrictive fiscal policy has prevented and/or ended the 
recovery in the most troubled economies and has driven them into recession which 
in turn – together with the global economic slowdown – was responsible for the 
stagnation in the rest of the Euro area economies in 2012.  It can also be seen that 
the economic recovery that set in in some countries in the periphery in 2014 and 
2015 may well be related to a slowdown in the pace of fiscal consolidation or even 
a slight expansion. 
 
3. The EU Commission’s insufficient strategy for public 
investment and fiscal stimulus 
It is by now widely accepted on the EU level that a more expansionary fiscal 
policy against the imminent deflationary stagnation is necessary. Therefore the new 
Commission has launched mainly two initiatives substantially enlarging its 
predecessor‟s efforts (European Commission 2014f and 2015c). They can be 
divided into three main sets of measures. The first two of them are particularly 
concerned with promoting (public) investment in Europe. First, the so-called 
„investment clause‟ under the preventive arm of the treaty is specified and will 
potentially be made applicable on more occasions. Second, an Investment Plan for 
Europe, the „Juncker-Plan‟ has been launched, i.e. a European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI) to finance investment on a large scale. Third, the interpretation 
of the SGP has been clarified with the aim of providing more fiscal leeway for 
member states under adverse economic conditions and/or implementing structural 
reforms. 
As to the first measure, the underlying idea of the „investment clause‟ dates 
back to the Commission „blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union„, which envisaged allowing a temporary deviation from the MTO or the 
adjustment path towards it under the preventive arm if it was the result of „non-
recurrent, public investment programmes with a proven impact on sustainability of 
public finances‟ (European Commission 2012: 25), e.g. projects co-financed by the 
EU.
iii
 However, the Commission made clear from the very beginning that this 
would have nothing to do with a golden investment rule which it called „an 
indiscriminate approach [that] could easily put in danger the prime objective of the 
SGP by undermining the sustainability of government debt‟ (European 
Commission 2012: 25). In this spirit the implementation of the idea was very 
restrictive, and it continues to be even under the clarifications made by the new 
Commission. 
The only improvement compared to the earlier interpretation is that the adverse 
economic conditions that have to apply now refer only to the member state in 
question and not to the overall situation of the EU or the Euro area (European 
Commission 2015: 9). In the past the „investment clause‟ provided support for 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia (European Commission 2015c: 9) while it was 
denied to Italy (Barbiero & Darvas 2014: 6). The EU Parliament had passed a 
resolution that the „investment clause‟ was too narrow and might therefore be 
extended to completely exclude expenditures for co-funded public investment 
(European Parliament 2013), but obviously its initiative as to a „small-scale golden 
investment rule‟ has not been taken up by the Commission to date. Even if it had, 
the overall impact on public investment in the EU would have been extremely 
limited, as the volume of eligible projects is relatively small. However, particularly 
the CEE member states might have profited substantially (Barbiero & Darvas 
2014: 7). 
The second and most prominent measure is the Investment Plan for Europe with 
– according to the Commission‟s hopes – a European-wide total investment impact 
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of 315 bn. Euros from 2015 to 2017 (European Commission 2014f). This is 
supposed to be reached without additional public debt on the national or European 
level and without any additional EU expenditures by the creation of a European 
Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) which is guaranteed by 21 bn. Euros from 
the EU budget (16 bn. through reallocation from existing resources) and EIB 
reserves (5 bn.). The fund is to mobilise finance for investments in key areas such 
as infrastructure, education, research and innovation. For this purpose, an 
investment pipeline of strategic projects supported by a specialist investment hub 
of technical assistance will be provided. Finally, barriers to investment are to be 
removed and improvements in the regulatory regime achieved. As a leverage effect 
of 15 through the use of financial instruments by the EIB is expected, the 21 bn. 
Euros are supposed to deliver the overall investment volume of 315 bn. Euros. 
Funding shall be provided to both public and private investors mostly for long-term 
large scale investment (240 bn. Euros) and to a smaller extent (75 bn. Euros) to 
support investment by small and medium sized firms. An even larger investment 
volume is suggested to the extent that contributions from the private sector or from 
the member states increase the guaranteed capital. Indeed, in order to enable 
member states to contribute, the Commission has made it clear that such 
contributions will be excluded from both the preventive and the corrective arm of 
the SGB (European Commission 2015c: 6-7). 
It is difficult to evaluate the prospects of the Investment Plan for Europe as it is 
still in its early stages. However, there are many open questions and whether the 
Plan will really deliver is quite doubtful. First of all, one may call into question 
whether the volume of the plan is large enough. Even if it really led to 315 bn. 
Euros of additional investment that would be about 2.25 per cent of EU GDP or 3 
per cent of Euro area GDP spread over three years, i.e. 0.75 or 1 per cent of GDP 
per year, respectively. Given the depth of the economic crisis, particularly in the 
euro area, this is insufficient. Furthermore, given the long term character of many 
of the large scale investment projects it will probably take quite a long time before 
a significant number of projects will be realized. The most important doubts, 
however, relate to the question whether the Plan will really be able to mobilise 
sufficient additional investment: If it is to stimulate private investment, particularly 
in the crisis countries typically „animal spirits‟ will be low, which means that it will 
be difficult to find investors irrespective of the terms of the programme. If 
investors are found, then the danger of windfall gains, i.e. that the investors would 
have chosen the project, anyway, could be large. And if they really invest because 
of the favourable conditions of the programme, the question as to the efficiency of 
the programme arises, especially if it is a PPP project: If the fund offers private 
investors attractive returns then these returns will have to be paid for, either 
directly by the public contributor involved or indirectly through charges to the 
private sector that might otherwise have been avoided. If the fund is to stimulate 
public investment, one may wonder why this could not be realized by national 
governments‟ regular investment. If it is because of fiscal constraints due to the 
stability and growth pact, an obvious alternative would be removing or loosening 
those constraints. All in all, therefore, the risk is high that the Investment Plan for 
Europe will deliver disappointingly little too late.    
The third set of measures consists of different clarifications and formalisations 
of the interpretation of the SGP (European Commission 2015c: 9-17). First, 
structural reforms may justify temporary deviations from the MTO or the 
adjustment path towards it under the preventive arm.  
“The Commission will take into account the positive fiscal impact of 
structural reforms under the preventive arm of the Pact, provided that such 
reforms (i) are major, (ii) have verifiable direct long-term positive budgetary 
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effects, including by raising potential sustainable growth, and (iii) are fully 
implemented.”  (European Commission 2015c: 12). 
Even under the corrective arm structural reforms may be considered as a 
„relevant‟ factor, which may lead to the decision that no excessive deficit exists or 
that the deadline for correcting an existing excessive deficit may be postponed 
under certain conditions. Second, a clarification of cyclical conditions has been 
provided. Under the preventive arm adverse cyclical conditions may lead to a 
diminishing of the adjustment requirement towards the MTO. In exceptionally bad 
times no structural adjustment is required, in very bad times it is only 0.25 per cent 
of GDP instead of the previous standard value of 0.5 per cent. For member states 
under the corrective arm, an unexpected fall in economic activity may now be 
better accommodated, as fiscal effort will be assessed in a more differentiated way 
using measures of discretionary fiscal effort that do not suffer from the endogeneity 
bias of the structural budget balance. Third and finally, the Commission has stated 
that a severe downturn in the Euro area or the EU as a whole may justify slowing 
down the pace of consolidation for all member countries both under the preventive 
and the corrective arm. 
All in all, the measures introduced or proposed by the new Commission 
constitute some progress with regard to counter-cyclical fiscal policies and (public) 
investment. However, it must be doubted that they will lead to a substantial 
increase in (public) investment. And the clarifications concerning the SGP are 
obviously only designed to permit a slightly less restrictive fiscal stance but not to 
provide a truly positive fiscal stimulus. 
  
4. Towards a more ambitious re-interpretation of the SGP: 
using the existing institutional leeway to boost the European 
economy  
What can be done instead to help the Euro area economy recover strongly? Of 
course, the current institutional framework with the SGP and the Fiscal Compact 
does not offer a generally favourable climate for expansionary fiscal policy. 
Governments‟ deficits and debts in the EU are constrained by numerous rules (see 
European Commission 2013 for an overview).  
The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) within the corrective arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is currently being applied to seven Euro area 
members: Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
iv
 It 
requires the general government budget deficit to be reduced to below 3 % of GDP. 
Member states under the EDP must bring their budget deficit below 3 % of GDP 
within a time period specified by the EU Council after recommendations from the 
Commission. The constraints for structural deficits under the preventive arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact apply to all member states not 
under the excessive deficit procedure. Member states that have not reached their 
medium term budgetary objective (MTO) had already been obliged to decrease 
structural deficits annually by a minimum of 0.5 % of GDP under the old SGP. The 
Fiscal Compact has made these prescriptions more binding by calling for 
institutionalised debt brakes on the national level that are to ensure that cyclically 
adjusted deficits are kept under 0.5 % of GDP with automatic corrections in the 
case of deviations. The new debt related branch of the EDP calling for a 1/20
th
 
annual reduction of the part of the debt-GDP ratio that is above the 60 % threshold 
of the SGP. This rule will become effective after member states have left the EDP, 
because they have reached the 3-%-target with respect to the budget deficit. As the 
target for debt-GDP ratio is taken into account in the formulation of national 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(2), A. Truger, & M. Nagel, p.235-255. 
248 
248 
medium term objectives this new prescription will most probably not be binding in 
most cases. 
As stated before, without a substantial fiscal expansion for at least a few years 
the Euro area will hardly escape from stagnation or even deflationary stagnation.. 
As in the short run major institutional reforms do not look very likely, alternative 
ways must be found within the existing framework unless some governments 
decide to openly refuse obeying the rules and taking into account possible (though 
maybe not probable) sanctions and political quarrels within the European Union. 
Therefore, the European Commission would have to change its current 
interpretation of the existing framework which – as argued before – still shies away 
from re-empowering fiscal policy as a macroeconomic policy instrument. If the 
Commission instead used the interpretational leeway that the current institutions 
leave, it could provide substantial room for manoeuvre for national governments to 
switch to a truly expansionary fiscal policy. Indeed, the clarification by the 
Commission as to making optimal use of the flexibility (European Commission 
2015c) can be seen as hinting at the direction that would need to be followed. It 
would at some points simply need a few interpretational steps further to enable a 
substantial fiscal policy boost. Unlike the Juncker-Plan to boost public or 
(publically supported) investment through investment funds the strategy would 
provide a direct boost to public (investment) spending on the national level and 
does not have to rely on highly insecure shifting and leveraging of public funds on 
the European level in the hope of finding private investors at times when business 
confidence is extremely low.  
Least controversial, the one country that is currently in a rather favourable 
position as to its budgetary situation, Germany, should use up its safety-margin to 
its Medium Term Objective and to the limits of its national debt brake and increase 
public (investment) spending in order to stimulate domestic demand, increase 
imports and help its neighbours to recover. Currently, the safety margin as 
calculated by the EU Commission is in the order of magnitude of 1.4 % of GDP in 
2015 (see table 5). If it was in fact used to increase public (investment) spending, 
the overall effect for the Euro area economy would not be very strong, but certainly 
not completely negligible. Actually, using this leeway was even recommended by 
the European Commission (2014e) and approved by the Council. 
Additionally, the EU-Commission should use aggressively any interpretational 
leeway within the preventive as well as the corrective arm of the SGP in order to 
allow for a more expansionary fiscal stance in additional countries.
v
 In this sense, 
at least the following eight measures that are generally complementary to each 
other should be considered (see table 5).
vi
  
Table 4. Eight ways to strengthen investment and facilitate an expansionary overall fiscal 
policy stance in Europe 
(1) more active use of the „investment clause‟ 
(2) allow for temporary investment programmes (analogous to EFSI) 
(3) interpret temporary investment programmes  as structural reforms 
(4) incorporate realistic investment multiplier in budgetary analysis ex ante 
(5) use leeway in economically bad times  
(6) use exception for severe downturn in EU or Euro area 
(7) temporarily higher spending with a view to Europe 2020 goals 
(8) implement better methods of cyclical adjustment 
Source: Authors‟ compilation. 
 
There are at least four possibilities to explicitly strengthen public investment 
within the current fiscal framework (measures 1 to 4 in table 4). Indeed, 
strengthening public investment within the Euro area should be of the highest 
priority: Public investment is particularly conducive to growth both in the short and 
the long run (see Truger 2015b: chapter 3) and it has suffered from austerity 
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policies in a disproportionally strong way (Barbiero & Darvas, 2014; Truger 
2015b: chapter 2).  
Turning to the „investment clause‟, this should at least be opened to 
unconditionally include all investment that is supported by European funds, exactly 
as it was called for by the European Parliament (2013) (measure 1 in table 4). 
Furthermore, at least additional net investment could be justified if it came in the 
form of a temporary investment programme, analogous to the way the Commission 
interprets contributions to the EFSI (measure 2 in table 4). Additionally or 
alternatively, it may also be possible to treat a sufficiently comprehensive  
investment programme as a structural reform that temporarily allows for deviations 
from MTO or the adjustment path towards it (measure 3 in table 4). All of this 
could further be supported if realistically high multiplier values were used in 
assessing the budgetary impact of additional investment, which may not be 
significantly negative or even positive. This would mean that such additional 
investment could be irrelevant at least under the excessive deficit procedure as it 
would not (or hardly not) increase the deficit: The additional spending should not 
be counted as a one-to-one increase in the (structural) government deficit. If the EU 
Commission adopted a realistic attitude as to fiscal multipliers that was in line with 
the recent results from the literature, any increase in public (investment) spending 
would lead to a much smaller increase in the deficit due to its positive 
macroeconomic effects. As seen, spending multipliers – especially for public 
investment – are well above one which means that such spending increases will be 
self-financing to a substantial extent (e.g. 50-75%). If this were taken into account 
when evaluating national stability programmes and for the remaining temporarily 
higher deficit the existing leeway within the preventive and corrective arm (see 
below) were used, the potential positive fiscal stance could be substantial (at least 
twice or triple as large as the resulting increase in the budget deficit). For example 
an increase in public investment by 1 per cent of GDP would only lead to an 
increase in the budget deficit of 0.25 to 0.5 per cent of GDP – a deviation that may 
be easy to justify with the structural reform argument or with exceptional 
circumstances. Furthermore, if the European Commission stuck to its pro-cyclical 
method of cyclical adjustment the resulting increase in GDP and decrease in 
unemployment should lead to an upward revision of potential GDP (see Truger 
2016). In addition to this, an increase in public investment should automatically 
lead to an increase in the investment to GDP level which should in turn increase 
potential GDP. 
In addition to the four measures to specifically increase public investment at 
least four more exist to justify a more expansionary fiscal policy stance, be it to 
(further) promote public investment or other desired stimulus measures (measures 
5-8 in table 4). For example, reference to adverse cyclical conditions may help to 
increase fiscal leeway even further (measure 5 in table 4), although this could 
create the danger of a stop-and-go policy, if cyclical conditions improve as can be 
expected under a stimulus programme.  Probably the most convincing way to do 
this would be to use the provision concerning a severe downturn in the Euro area or 
the EU to justify a temporary deviation from the consolidation path, thus allowing 
for a substantial European stimulus programme (measure 6 in table 4). The 
Commission has explicitly made a comparison with the 2008 European Economic 
Recovery Plan (European Commission 2008) to give an example of the potential 
use of this provision (European Commission 2015c: 17). As a condition for the use 
of this provision it “should remain limited to exceptional, carefully circumscribed 
situations to minimise the risk of moral hazard.” (European Commission 2015c: 
17). Actually, one may well argue that the Euro area is right now in such an 
exceptional situation after years of recession and stagnation and the threat of 
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deflation while monetary policy is at the lower bound. Such a European stimulus 
programme should provide an annual stimulus of at least one per cent of GDP for 
two or three years. One option for the direction of the programme would be to use 
it in order to start phasing in traditional net public investment. Alternatively or 
additionally such a programme could also be used to allow for spending needs 
beyond the narrow national accounts definition of public investment (measure 7 in 
table 4).
vii
 Such a direction would meet concerns that traditional tangible 
investment would be promoted whereas other important forms of investment in the 
economic sense of the word would be neglected. This could be investment in 
education, including child care, but it could more generally focus on spending with 
a view to achieving the currently neglected Europe 2020 goals such as social 
inclusion or other areas that have strongly suffered from austerity over the last 
years.  
Last, but certainly not least, a reconsideration of the EU Commission‟s method 
of cyclical adjustment (measure 8 in table 4) – e.g. to be more in line with the 
OECD method and results – would help tremendously in creating further leeway as 
it might increase the calculated cyclical part of the budget deficit thus reducing the 
structural deficit (Truger, 2015). The European Commission‟s reaction to the 
problems of the cyclical adjustment of public finances are – at best – ambivalent. 
On the one hand, on an intellectual level the Commission seems to be conscious of 
the problems and is regularly addressing them in papers or some more or less 
minor (in terms of the policy implications) changes in the technical procedures. On 
the other hand, the Commission shies away from drawing obvious conclusions in 
terms of practical fiscal policy and consolidation requirements for the future. The 
Commission has continuously been changing its method of cyclical adjustment 
over time (see Truger & Will, 2013). For the autumn 2010 economic forecast the 
estimation procedure for total factor productivity was changed, explicitly with the 
aim of providing more stability for the short term potential output and output gap 
estimates (European Commission, 2010b, 120-124). Also the Commission has 
often dealt with the problem of time-varying tax elasticities and their role in the 
determination of the structural budget balance (European Commission, 2010b, 124-
130). It has even admitted that the estimates of the fiscal effort based on the change 
in the structural (primary) budget balance tend to underestimate the true 
discretionary consolidation efforts and is since then using complementary measures 
to assess fiscal effort (European Commission, 2013a, 101-132) that have even been 
used in the assessment of effective action taken under the excessive deficit 
procedure (European Commission, 2013b). Time varying tax elasticities and a 
deterioration of potential output have even been accepted as a retrospective 
justification that the structural budget balance did not improve as required under 
the excessive deficit procedure, e.g. in the case of Spain, by the European Council 
(European Council, 2013, 8). Finally, in the spring 2014 forecast the Commission 
changed its NAIRU estimation procedure as important part of the determination of 
potential output, in order to avoid „excessively pro-cyclical NAWRUs under 
certain circumstances‟ (European Commission, 2014d, 27), however making clear 
that  this would not lead to a revision of the required fiscal effort (European 
Commission, 2014d, 29). 
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Table 5. Output gap, structural budget balance (EU Commission fall 2015 estimate and 
modification) 2015 and medium term objective for 12 Euro area countries in % of GDP  
  
Output gap  
2015 
(Commission) 
Output gap  
2015 
(modification) 
Structural 
balance  
2015 
(Commission) 
Structural 
balance  
2015 
(modification) 
Medium term 
objective 
(MTO) 
Austria -0,9 -4,7 -0,6 1,7 0.45) 
Belgium -1,2 -1,7 -2,5 -2,1 0,75 
Euro area (12 countr.) -2,0 -6,9 -1,1 1,4 -0,31 
Finland -2,4 -9,7 -1,7 2,4 0 
France -1,8 -6,1 -2,7 -0,2 -0.4 
Germany -0,7 -0,9 0,9 1,0 -0.5 
Greece -5,6 -26,8 -1,1 9,3 0 
Ireland -3,7 -9,0 -3,0 -0,2 0 
Italy -3,1 -11,7 -1,0 3,7 0 
Luxembourg -4,0 -9,6 0,7 3,2 0.5 
Netherlands -2,9 -8,4 -1,1 2,6 -0.5 
Portugal -2,9 -9,6 -1,8 1,6 -0,5 
Spain -2,9 -10,9 -2,5 2,4 0 
1) weighted average of available values. 
Source: European Commission (2010a; 2014a; 2014b, 2015a; 2015b); Author‟s calculations. 
 
As already illustrated in the calculations before, this could lead to a much more 
adequate picture of the fiscal effort that has already been undertaken by the 
member states which in turn would make it easier to justify exceptional 
circumstances under the preventive and the corrective arm. The upward revision of 
(negative) output gaps (table 1) would underline the extremely bad cyclical 
condition in which many member states are trapped. It is most implausible to 
assume (as the Commission does) that the Greek output gap in 2015 was as small 
as -5.6 % when the Greek economy had lost about a quarter of its pre-crisis output. 
Last but not least, the estimates of the structural budget balance would then be 
revised upwards lifting a number of member states above their MTOs so that they 
would enjoy additional leeway. For example, table 5 shows that – in addition to 
Germany and Luxembourg – Austria, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain would already have reached their MTOs in 2015 if the 
structural balance had been calculated with the potential growth estimates of the 
pre-austerity-era in spring 2010. And for practically all other countries the distance 
to their MTOs would have been reduced substantially.  
Taking all of the proposals for a more expansionary interpretation of the 
existing institutional framework together, a Euro area-wide expansionary fiscal 
stance of two to three per cent of GDP would be quite realistic. One might want to 
argue that the interpretational changes proposed here are so far-reaching that they 
might be seen as an abandonment of the existing SGP, involving questions of time-
inconsistency and credibility. However, this would hardly seem convincing. First, 
the interpretation proposed here still uses the terminology and the framework of the 
existing pact. Therefore, if there is a problem of credibility, then it is one that is 
inherent in the current framework, with its vague and imprecise terminology that 
leaves much room for interpretation. Not the particular interpretation, but the 
current fiscal framework as such would then suffer from problems of credibility. 
Second, the EU Commission has, for several years in a row, announced strictness 
in the application of the rules ex ante, only to relax the requirements when 
countries ran into problems ex post. One may well argue that a clear ex ante-
relaxation of requirements is more credible than a ritual game of strict 
announcements that have to be regularly withdrawn ex post.  
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4. Conclusion 
Most parts of the Euro area have seen eight years of deep economic crisis. 
Austerity policies have played a major role in this economic, social and political 
tragedy. The EU needs to address these problems. The previous strategy of 
tightening the fiscal constraints of the SGP has driven many member states into 
austerity and has disempowered national fiscal policy as a macroeconomic policy 
instrument. Unfortunately, in a situation, with depressed aggregate demand, 
deflationary tendencies and monetary policy at the lower bound, fiscal policy is the 
only instrument left that could bring about a sustained recovery. The EU 
Commission is shying away from this conclusion and tries to evade anything that 
might change the present institutional framework of fiscal policy although in 
practice it regularly concedes leeway for member states.  
In the medium to long run the Euro area (and the EU) will probably need a far-
reaching reform of its institutional framework to foster growth and employment 
and to protect and strengthen the welfare state (see e.g. Hein, Truger and van 
Treeck 2012). However, even in the short run, the current institutional framework 
(SGP, fiscal compact) offers interpretational leeway sufficient to allow for a 
substantial fiscal expansion that could boost the European economy at least for the 
next two or three years. If the new European Commission acted responsibly and 
used the opportunity in a way similar to the one sketched, the prospects for a strong 
recovery in the Euro area would be quite good (see Truger 2016). All it would need 
is the will to be a bit more consequent in using the leeway provided by the current 
framework. It is to be hoped that it will not again take years of stagnation and more 
millions of unemployed before European Policy makers draw the right conclusions 
and start reviving fiscal policy.  
 
 
Notes 
 
i The European Commission (2010a) published potential output forecast only until 2014. For the 
calculation the forecast 2014 potential growth rate was simply reproduced for 2015. 
ii A further underestimation or at least inaccuracy in the estimation of structural budget balances may 
result from deviations of actual budgetary semi-elasticities from the estimated average values in the 
procedure of cyclical adjustment (see European Commission. 2010b. 124-128, Zack et al. 2014, for 
the case of Spain as well as Hein & Truger 2014, 24-25 in the case of Germany). 
iii See Prota & Viesti (2013) for a summary of the developments around and the debate about the 
„investment clause‟. 
iv  Cyprus and Greece face even stronger restrictions as they are subject to financial assistance 
programmes. 
v See Micossi & Peirce (2014) as well as Truger (2015) for an earlier overview of the potential 
flexibility that is provided within the European fiscal rules that partly anticipated the new 
interpretation by the European Commission (2015). Micossi‟s and Peirce‟s conclusion that the rules 
provide sufficient flexibility and that, therefore, there is no need for reform is, however, not shared. 
vi This paper only includes measures that could plausibly be implemented without any changes in the 
current institutional framework. See Truger (2015) for a proposal of a Golden Rule for Public 
Investment that would generally allow debt financing of net public investment. Although the case 
for such a rule is very strong, it is not included here, as it would most probably require a change of 
the European treaty or at least of the relevant Council regulations (see Blanchard & Giavazzi 2004: 
15).    
vii Aiginger (2014) has made a similar proposal which he called the „silver rule‟ proposal. Whereas the 
golden rule allows permanent debt financing of all net investment, the silver rule allows temporary 
debt financing of additional investment. 
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